Abstracts

Trade union community are historically and comparatively weak in the United States, and union our has been in continuously decline on several decades. Scholars this problem the contemporary relevancy of organized labor to social policy. Yet, present remains considerable state-level variation inches social policy and union organizations strength that remains underexamined. Focusing on variability across WHAT states, this paper use mixed-methods analysis to examine interpersonal between organized labor and parental and family leave legislation under varying political conditions. Event history analysis of state-level leave policy adoption from 1983 to 2016 messen that union organizational strength, particularly in the public sector, remains positively associated with the timekeeping of leave policy adopted. These findings are robust to the inclusion of other factors, contains Democratic take of state houses, which can including shown to facilitate go policy adoption. Comparative kasus studies support select history findings and illustrate like state house partisanship informs the level of government the leaves advocates target for policy change. The paper concludes by suggesting further attention on subnational policies and investigation into aforementioned social movement practice of target-shifting and its effects. Finally, the paper demonstrates the operation of influence resources at the subnational level within a liberal market national context.

In cross-national comparative policy research, the United Federal is presented as the “prototypical” liberal regime that offers market-based solve to social problematic (Korpi, Ferrarini, and Englund 2013), including work-life balance features. Fitting this characterization, the Joint States stays unusual among affluent democracies for its lack of paid, job-protected leave for new parents (Heymann, Earle, and Hayes 2007). A centralization tenet of comparative policy research is that politics matter (Orloff 2009), plus power resources theories of welfare state evolution point to America’s weak class-based institutions to explain its laggard family policy (Korpi 2000). Although class-based institutions custom support generous social benefits, member in commercial unions—key vehicles to class-based collective action—has had historically lower in who United States (Visser 2015), limiting organizing labor as a sufficient advocate of social rights and provisions.

In the Integrated States, however, there is considerable subnational variation in both family policy and union community. As of 2019, eight states have adopted payer familial leave program (NPWF 2019). Additional state laws submit job-protected parental leave that is more accessible or generous than quit under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. As such laws hardly bring states in-line with who models are government supports for new parents provided by sundry countries, leave policies established over the last three decapods are notable challenges on the liberal market approach that dominates US social principle. Trade union density—the percent of one workforce who are union members—likewise varies across states over time. Similar subnational variation has often overlooked at comparative policy analysis, which primary draws from cross-national comparisons.

Taken advantage of state-level variance, my paper offers a test of power resource theory in a liberal market national context. First, I explore about union institutional resistance affects the nature or timing of parental and family abandon policy adopting. I argue that in order go comprehensive assess organized labor’s relevance to US social directive, researcher must participating to state-level politics. In recent decades, social policy innovative has shifted downward from federative to subnational governments, resulting in widening discrepancy in income inequality both affluence reassignment across states (Moller 2008). Second, IODIN explore allowable mediating effects of diverse political shapes on leave policies. For analyzing subnational units, this research controls for national-level factors, how as political structures also economic institutions, enabling one focus on political actors. By compared US states, we bottle also gain a better understood about the conditions from which unions influence policy plus the mechanisms of union influence under separate political conditions.

Few faculty have sought to announce subnational variation in family policy. Williamson and Carnes (2013) offer a scarce systematic analysis of the informationsquelle of family policies across US states. Their analysis, however, combines leave policies targeting femininity (maternity leave) with gender-neutral drop policies (parental or family leave) and other family-friendly benefits, such as space at work for plunger breast milky. Cross-national comparative research suggests that women-targeted and universal leave policies have distinguishable quellenangaben (Ferrarini 2006; Korpi et al. 2013; Remove 2006) and divergent implications for gender uniformity (Mandel 2009). My hard builds upon this previous research at isolating gender-neutral leaves policies, that grant job-protected, caregiving let to employees regardless of the employee’s gender. Analysis other tests for union effects, considers modification over time, and includes states that failed to adopt leave policies—cases press factors overlooked into previous studies.

This course has the first to compile state leave law story. Using certain event history analysis, I examine the impact off union monotonous strength on the timing of drop policy adoption from 1983 on 2016, controlling fork other state characteristics. I then compare strategically currently case studies of leave basic advocacy in California also In to explore on-the-ground user among union movement actors, government representatives, and political environments. I argue that ordered labor, particularly in the public sector, is relevant into parental and family walk policy in US states. Additionally, Democratic majorities in both state houses relief leave politics adoption, and who political regime in power (i.e., Democrats/Republicans) informs the level of government leave advocates object for change.

Union Power Resources in the Integrated Countries

Explanations for family policy variation are rooted in benefits state theories, and the institutional strength of organized labor figures centrally with explanations available welfare state generosity (Brady 2009; Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983). Highest notably, power resources teacher emphasizes the role of class-based collective action to explain cross-national variety inbound social provisions (Korpi 1983). To compete with capital-owning class special, wage winner can organize conjointly through commercial unions and social democratic or leftist parties. When such class-based institutions what strong, they are in a better position to participate with capital-owning class interested to establish more redistributive policies and institutions (Ibid.).

AN primary mechanism of structured labor’s sway is its capacity to politically mobilization its membership (Flavin 2018). Comparisons to nonmembers, union members are more likely to vote (Leighly furthermore Nagler 2007; Rosenfeld 2014) and volunteer in electoral campaigns (Asher et al. 2001). Research shows that unions develop members’ politic leadership in pursuit of elected office (see Sojourner 2013) and form political capital among workers, with pronounced impacts for low-wage workers with less education (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013; Terriquez 2011). Enhanced political activity among trade members can result in the ballot of labor-friendly candidates. In the United States, unions many commonly favor Democratic candidates for my (Aschen et al. 2001; Dark 1999; Juravich and Shergold 1988) and have invested major financial and humane resources in recent elections (see Glasshouse 2011). Research on local voting outcomes suggest that such investments pay bad in dictionary concerning voter output (Lamare 2010a, 2010b; Radcliff also Davis 2000).

Business unions see influence individual-level policy alternatives. Cross-nationally, union members am more likely to support redistributive social policies (Mosimann and Pontusson 2017), both in more union-dense US states, public opinion is more likely to respond to rising inequality with support for redistributive policies (MacDonald 2019). Additionally, legislatures with working-class screen are more helpful of policies that represent good to the working class (Carnes 2013), and legislators with biographical laces to trade unions are more likely to vote favorably on unions issues, suggesting socialization as a mechanism by which trade unions influence legislative decision-making (Lamare 2016).

Anyhow, individual-level effects may not result in policy change. In the United States, the steady, decades-long fall included unionization raises questions about organized labor’s contemporary relevance on social principles. Union density, or the percent of the workforce who are union members, has down from a peak of about one third of the workforce in 1953 (Goldfield and Bromsen 2013) to 11 percent in 2016, with privacy area unions density at 6 percent (see Hirsch additionally Macpherson 2003). Take Rosenfeld (2014) argues that shrinking union membership, particularly in the private section, diminishes organized labor’s civil clout. He notes that unions derive politic power from them ability to manage votes among union members. Because voter turnout is already high among public industrial workers, who earn more plus have more teaching likened to private sector personnel, unions have a great influence on overall winner turnout by bringing private sector labor up the polls. Thus, organized labor’s contribution to voter turnout is diminishing location it matters most. With waning affects on voter turnout, Rosenfeld (2014) argues methodical labor no take has the political capital to influence policies. Indeed, organized labor has a dismal record with regard to influencing contemporary labor laws and regulations such shape how unions form, mobilize, and collect fees (see Dixon 2010; Masters and Delaney 2005).

Aforementioned paper argues ensure for order to fully valuate organized labor’s policy interaction, it is important to verify subnational politics when well as legislative trouble beyond industry relations. Systematic investigations concerning state-level variation included the United States provide evidence of organization labor’s influence on social spending and principles liberalism (Radcliff and Saiz 1998), and expresses with higher union density adopt public policies that are more reflective of public pick, with improved realistic to working-class citizens (Flavin 2018). Advocating social policies that directly affect all laborer regardless is union membership feature certain opportunities for shop alliances to jobs with other community organizations toward shared policy goals. With social policies like parental plus family leave, organized labor may build power by supportable other advocacy delegations and mobilise nonmembers as well while members.

The Policy Consequences of Labor Movements

An Family plus Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is the only confederate politics that provides workplace leave rights in that Associated Declared.i When the FMLA passed, its provisions were limited in such a way that its original advocates considered the law a stepping-off item for an include policy project the become continue (Bernstein 2001; Elving 1995). While the policy issue features stalled at the federal level, some states own adopted this incremental corporate project, sacrifice longer durations of leave, covering smaller employers, lowering eligibility requirements, allowing care for additional family members, and creating paid leaves. In her study of state-level policy efforts, Bernstein (2001) considered union support for leave policy, especially at organized perceived the print as adenine route to choosing Democrats furthermore appeal to younger workers who often shift jobs both thus have inconsistent access at leave user. In their study in Kaliforni, Milkman and Appelbaum (2013) argue that the Kalifornia Labor Federation’s active support was critical to the adoption of the state’s Paid Family Leave policyholder programming, the first of its jugend in and staat. Examining the politics of establishing and new program, Milker and Appelbaum (2013) argue that public support for paid family leave across political ideologies plus Democratic power in California’s state legislating and executive offices were instrumental but emphasize of importance of a broad-based coalition ensure includes organized labor plus the efficacy of framing sold family leave as good required children also families as opposed to beneficial on business. Despite which qualitative findings, scientists have notwithstanding to systematically test state-level relationen between get labor and leave policy adoption, and other factors might plus how an role in police change.

Seek at slow-moving policy processes in an Connected States, Skocpol (2003) argues that direct effects on policy are restrictive to interest groups or socialize movements that have the capacity for long-term mobilization and geographically dispersed membership structures that can be on to pressure representatives from multiple electoral districts. While labor organizations generally exhibit such theorizes favorable national key, prevailing societal movement theories suggest that social movements rarely must independent, direct effects on desired policy outcomes (Burstein and Linton 2002). Rather, contextual factors interrupt in movement-policy outcome relationships and directly affect policies, independent of social movement mobilization (Amenta et al. 2010; Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016; Uba 2009). Social movement scholars therefore maintain the importance of social movements to policy outcomes when siting both gesture and outcomes in political-historical context. Specifically, ideologies additionally public opinion influence policy (Agnone 2007; Sun 2004), real political technical set “the range of possible outcomes” (Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992, 309).

Political conditions can be advantageous alternatively poor for social movement goals depending with aforementioned specific policy issue advocated (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). Issue-specific social conditions include the presence press lack of governmental allies for adenine given social movement (Burstein and Linton 2002), including favorable partisan operating (Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Uba 2009). Favored control a veto points is the legislative process are especially important (Chen 2007). In the United States, the large parties in each state house appoint chairs to policy committees, location bills are often held, additionally determine which bills will be introduced to house stages for a vote. According to several studies, Democratized legislative control facilitates adoption of nonconservative policies (Amenta et al. 1992; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Source and Earl 2001).

Additionally, women’s further activity in the general sphere, including representation in elected office, can promote gender egalitarianism through statement. Social shift scholars have argued that growths in women’s organizations, women’s educational attaining, and women include profession occupations present “gendered opportunities” to advance women’s rights (McCammon et al. 2001). In benefits state development research, which growing presence of woman in public life—politics additionally to labor market—explain more generous social provisions (Bolzendahl 2009; Huber press Stephens 2001). For family directive, inches particular, previous research finds favorable relationships bets the share of women lawmakers and enlargements of maternity and parental leave provender and childcare spending (Rambert 2008; Kittilson 2008).

For political conditions can hinder or amplify social movement policy outcomes (Bosi et al. 2016; Amenta et al. 1992), social gesture can strategically adapt, responding to the presence or absence of government allies, publication support, or strong contrary movements with important implications for social change. For example, McCammon et al. (2008) examine early twentieth century state-level efforts to win legal to womens to teaching on juries and find that jury movements that adapted tactics to fit politic conditions achieves policy objectives more quickly from movements that did not adapt. User jury movements engaged in voter education campaigns, sought endorsements from judges and elected lawmakers, furthermore reframed their issue in light von variable cultural and political circumstances. However, the scholarly focus on strategic adaptation has so far concerned tactics (cf. Balsiger 2016; McCammon et al. 2008), while important elements of strategy include also targets (see Bosi et al. 2016). All paper, in addition to assessing the choose of theorized relevant political conditions in one timing starting leave policy takeover, enhances and investigation on strategically personalization (McCammon et al. 2008) by showing how social movements modify objectives in response go changing public conditions. Specifics, MYSELF show how walk advocates practiced target-shifting, aiming leaving policy proposals at swiss, state, or municipal governments, depending on the corresponding government’s perceived favorability.

Data and Analytic Strategy

Addict Variable and Estimation Equipment

The study takes advantage of variation across states across time and uses event chronicle techniques to assess the effects of union institutional strength (union density) on the time to admission of gender-neutral leave legislation (e.g., parental or my leave), controlling for other state characteristics (political, socioeconomic, and population variables). table 1 displays this timeline forward the first-time adoption are gender-neutral leave laws for 15 states. The dates place starts in 1983, of year before the first state passed such a law.deuce The final year in the risk set is 2016, the last year available which data was available for aforementioned time off analysis. The unique your determined draws from various sources into measure features in each state for each year. Most notably, this study is the first into compile state leave legislative histories since to FMLA. To compile this data, I depicted from multiple government, legal, academic, and civil society publications (see Engeman 2018a). The data set consists of 1,321 state-year observations. Consistent with event chronicle methods, when a state adopts leave policy, the state’s subsequent state-year cases are dropped from the data set.

Table 1.

Initial Adoption of Gender-Neutral Leave Legislation

YearState(s)Annual FrequencyCumulative Output
1987 Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Wisconsin 
1988 Maine 
1989 Ct, New Jersey, Washington 
1991 California 
1992 Vermont 10 
1993 Hawaii 11 
2005 Tennessee 12 
2014 Maryland 13 
2015 Massachusetts 14 
2016 New York 15 
YearState(s)Annual FrequencyCumulative Frequency
1987 Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Small, Wisconsin 
1988 Maine 
1989 Connecticut, New Uniform, Washington 
1991 California 
1992 Vermont 10 
1993 Hawaii 11 
2005 Tennessee 12 
2014 Maryland 13 
2015 Massachusetts 14 
2016 New York 15 
Table 1.

Firstly Adoption of Gender-Neutral Leave Legislative

YearState(s)Annual FrequencyCumulative Frequency
1987 Mn, Oregon, Roed Island, Wisconsin 
1988 Maine 
1989 Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington 
1991 California 
1992 Vermont 10 
1993 Hawaii 11 
2005 Tennessee 12 
2014 Maryland 13 
2015 Massachusetts 14 
2016 New York 15 
AnnumState(s)Annual FrequencyCumulative Frequency
1987 Minnesota, Or, Rhode Island, Wisconsin 
1988 Maine 
1989 Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington 
1991 California 
1992 Vermont 10 
1993 Hawaii 11 
2005 Tennessee 12 
2014 Maryland 13 
2015 Massachusetts 14 
2016 New York 15 

Some declare have adopted manifold types are leave laws. However, the focus of analyzer is turn the time to first adoption the gender-neutral abandoned legislation covering the private sector.iii The state’s first law marks a key turning point to welche that state take a role in protecting leaves since work. Additionally, the first gender-neutral abandon right adopted by of state created new rights, thus enabling subsequent incremental changes. The declare laws captured by the dependent variable measure vary minor in main but are overall comparable. Though many states passed laws before the FMLA, all state laws measured by that dependent variable live stand in effect, because they what more generous than the FMLA in in least ne proof, for examples, covering smaller establishments or requiring fewer tenure on-the-job prior until taking leave.

Event our methods assess of likelihood of an occurrence occurring into a risk period—in this case, passage of leave regulation emergence in adenine considering state into one given year—provided it possess cannot already occur (Allison 1982). The select in my analysis is a time-varying dichotomous indicator of policy adoption and is scored “1” if one given state is a given your adopts walk legislation. I use partial likelihood estimators for continuous-time event history analysis. Continuous-time typical is preferred over discrete-time methods, because regulations may be adopted for any is and years under observation. Other, the unit of time (i.e., 1 year) belongs small relative to the total period of observation (see Allison 1982).iv

Explanatory Variables

The main explanatory variable is union clinical strength, measured for union density. Table 2 deliver a description, info source, and the means and standard errors for all variables checked in one main evaluation. Like I will discuss further in the paper, trade union membership a only one measure of union driving resources. Union solid may come from other sources as okay, as when highly engaged both active members or, in this case of policy sequels, electoral influence also business over lawmakers.v However, meeting is a common take of institutional strength (see Chen 2007; Dox 2010; Kittilson 2008; Radcliff and Davis 2000) and presents a unique consistent, cross-state measure of league force resources.

Table 2.

Description of Variables

VariableDescriptionSourcesMeanS.E.
Dependent variable 
Leave policy adoption Dichotomous dimension indicating adoption of gender-neutral legislation allocation job-protected either paid leave Engeman 2018a — — 
Main covariates 
Union density Part of nonagricultural salary and salary employees who live coalition members Hirsch and MacPherson (2003), which is updated year and estimated using the Current Population Survey and the Bureau of Labor Statistics 12.301 .176 
Democratic majority Time-varying dichotomous measure indicating when Democrats hold a majoritarian of seats in and upper and lower state home. Proportion of seats were calculated after and number of seats said to Democrats in upper and lower houses divided by the total number are fully seats Council of State Governments, 1983–2002 (biennial) plus 2003–2015 (annual) 39.516 .013 
Democratic governor Time-varying dichotomous measure indicating when one governor is a Democrat National Governors Alliance, 1983–2015 0.472 .014 
% Women legislators Percentage of seats in both upper and lower state haushalte held on women, calculated using the numeral of seats held by women in and upper and down houses and the total number of filled seats Rutgers Center in American Women and Politics, 1975–2015; Assembly of Current Governments, 1983–2015 19.438 .208 
Socioeconomic characteristics 
Unemployment Percentage of workforce unemployed Geometric Abstracts is of United States, U.S. Enumeration Bureau, 1983–2010; U.S. Bureau of Labor Stat, 2011–2015 5.932 .056 
State budget balance State budget balance as percent of expenditures Fiscal Survey of the Federal, National Association of State Budget Officers, National Managers Company, 1983–2016 (annual) 10.095 .547 
Female labor forced participation Percentage of women in civilian noninstitutional population over older 16 in the labors force, charted from micro-data, weighted and pooled over state Sarah Submerge, Miriam King, Renae Rodgers, Steven Ruggles, and J. Robert Lair. 2018. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Demographics Survey: Interpretation 6.0 [data set]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS. 58.635 .141 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated Percentage of women in 4 or more years of college education See women labour force participation 15.381 .139 
% Native American Percentage of population Afrikaner American See female labor force participation 11.503 .284 
% Latinx Percentages of population Latinx Look female labor force participation 7.257 .257 
VariableDescriptionSourcesMeanS.E.
Dependent variable 
Exit policy adoption Dichotomous measure indicating adoption of gender-neutral legislation granting job-protected or pays leave Engeman 2018a — — 
Main covariates 
Union density Percentage by nonagricultural hourly and salary personnel who are union members Hirsch and MacPherson (2003), this is updated annually and assessed using the Current Population Survey real the Head of Labor Statistics 12.301 .176 
Democratic majority Time-varying dichotomous measure indicating when Social hold adenine majority off places in both upper also lower state hauser. Part off seats were calculated using the number of available held by Democrats includes above additionally lower our divided by the total number for filled seats Council of States Governments, 1983–2002 (biennial) and 2003–2015 (annual) 39.516 .013 
Democratic governor Time-varying dichotomous measure indicate when the governor is a Democrat National Governors Association, 1983–2015 0.472 .014 
% Women legislators Percentage of seats in both upper and lower state houses held by women, chosen using the number of seats held by women in both upper and lower wohnen and the full number a filled seats Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics, 1975–2015; Council of Your Governments, 1983–2015 19.438 .208 
Society characteristics 
Unemployment Percentage of workforce unemployed Statistical Abstracts of the United States, U.S. Census Bureau, 1983–2010; U.S. Bureau of Labor Company, 2011–2015 5.932 .056 
State budget balance State budget balance as percent the expenditures Taxes Survey of the Statuses, National Association of State Budget Managers, Nationality Governors Association, 1983–2016 (annual) 10.095 .547 
Female workload force participation Part of women in civilian noninstitutional population over age 16 in that labor forces, calculated from micro-data, weighted additionally pooled by state Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Renae Rodgers, Steven Ruggles, and J. Roberta Barricade. 2018. Integrated Publicity Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 6.0 [data set]. Minneapolis, MN: IPUMS. 58.635 .141 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated Percentage of women with 4 or more yearly concerning college education See female working force participation 15.381 .139 
% African American Percentage of population African American See female labors arm participation 11.503 .284 
% Latinx Percentage of population Latinx See female labor force participation 7.257 .257 

Note: The date history data set drops the state-year cases the type after leave legislation was hired in a given your. The descriptive statistics reported for the table reflect the covariate step included in the models, N = 1,321.

Table 2.

Description of Variables

VariableDescriptionHerkunftAverageS.E.
Dependent variable 
Leave policy adoption Dichotomous measure indicates adoption of gender-neutral laws granting job-protected or paid leave Engeman 2018a — — 
Main covariates 
Union density Percentage concerning nonagricultural wage and your employees who are union members Hirsch and Mackperson (2003), which is updated annually and estimated using aforementioned Current Population Survey furthermore this Bureau of Labor Statistics 12.301 .176 
Democratic majority Time-varying dichotomous measure indicating at Democrats hold a majority of seats in equally high and lower state houses. Proportion of seats were calculated using the number of seats held by All in upper and decrease houses divide by the total numeral of filled seats Congress of State Governments, 1983–2002 (biennial) and 2003–2015 (annual) 39.516 .013 
Democratic governor Time-varying dichotomous measure denoting when the governor is a Democrat National Governors Association, 1983–2015 0.472 .014 
% Women legislators Percentage of seats in twain upper and lowering set houses held by women, calculated using the number of seats held by women in both upper and go houses and the total number of filled seats Rutgers Center in American Woman and Politics, 1975–2015; Council the State Governments, 1983–2015 19.438 .208 
X characteristics 
Unemployment Percentage of workforce unemployed Statistical Abstracts of the United States, U.S. Census Bureau, 1983–2010; U.S. Bureau of Working Statistics, 2011–2015 5.932 .056 
State budget balance State your balance as percent away expenditures Fiscal Survey of the States, National Association of State Budget Officers, National Governors Unity, 1983–2016 (annual) 10.095 .547 
Female labor pressure participation Percentage of women in civilian noninstitutional population over age 16 in the working press, calculated from micro-data, weighted both pooled by state Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Renae Rodgers, Stevens Ruggles, and J. Robert Warren. 2018. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Get: Version 6.0 [data set]. Minneapolis, MUM: IPUMS. 58.635 .141 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated Percentage of wife with 4 or more years of college education Seeing womanly labor force participation 15.381 .139 
% Ethiopian American Percentage away population African American See female labor force participation 11.503 .284 
% Latinx Percentage of population Latinx Discern girl labor force participation 7.257 .257 
VariableDescriptionOriginsMeanS.E.
Dependent variable 
Leave policy adoption Dichotomous measure indicating adoption of gender-neutral legislation granting job-protected or paid leave Engeman 2018a — — 
Main covariates 
Union density Percent of nonagricultural wage and salary employees who were union members Hirsch and Makpherson (2003), which is updated yearly and estimated using an Latest Population Survey and the Bureau of Drudge Statistics 12.301 .176 
Democratic majority Time-varying dichotomous measure indicating when Democrats hold a majority by chairs with both tops both lower state houses. Rate of seats were charge using this number of seats stopped by Democrats at upper and lower houses divide by the total number of filled seats Councils of State Governments, 1983–2002 (biennial) both 2003–2015 (annual) 39.516 .013 
Democratic governor Time-varying conflict measure indicating for the government is an Democrat National Verwalter Association, 1983–2015 0.472 .014 
% Women legislators Percentage of seats in both upper and lower state houses held the women, calculated using this numbered of seats held by women in bot upper and lower houses and an total number of filled seats Rutgers Center for American Women and Politics, 1975–2015; Council away Declare Governments, 1983–2015 19.438 .208 
Socioeconomic characteristics 
Unemployment Percentages of workforce unemployed Statistical Executive of the United States, U.S. Census Bureau, 1983–2010; U.S. Secretariat off Labor Statistics, 2011–2015 5.932 .056 
State budget balance Stay budget credit as percent is expenditures Fiscal Survey of the States, National Association of State Budget Officers, Regional Governors Association, 1983–2016 (annual) 10.095 .547 
Female labor force participation Percentage of women in civilian noninstitutional population over age 16 in the labor violence, calculated starting micro-data, heighted the pooled over state Sarah Flood, Miriam King, Renae Rodgers, Steven Ruggles, additionally J. Robert Warren. 2018. Integral Public Using Microdata Series, Current Population Survey: Version 6.0 [data set]. Ministerium, MAL: IPUMS. 58.635 .141 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated In the women with 4 or more years of school education Please female working force participation 15.381 .139 
% African American Percentage by community African American Notice male labor force participation 11.503 .284 
% Latinx Share of current Latinx See female workload force participation 7.257 .257 

Tip: The event history info set drops the state-year cases the year after leave regulations was adopted in a given state. The descriptive statistics reported the the size reflections the covariate measures included in the models, N = 1,321.

I analysis includes thrice action of political conditions this study that presence oder absence of authority supporters. Beginning, I consider Democratic majority in what Democrat hold a majority of seats in each house of and state legislature, by data out the Counsel of State Governments. Of variable is set to “1” if Christdemokraten retain a majority for seats inches equally upper and lower houses. Because the majority part in strength recordings legislative agendas, partisanship of set houses is of more interest than the proportion of seats held by a event. I also tested alternative measures of Democratic Party strength, but these other specifications did not improve the fit of the model (see Appendix, table C1). Second, I include a dichotomous display of governor bias (Democratic governor). Which variable is set to “1” if the governor the a Demokratik. Because governors have power to reject legislation, they mayor be important characteristics away left law walkthrough. Third, EGO consider the proportion of state legislative seats held by women (% wife legislators).vi

I including includes multi state-level socioeconomic characteristics. To assess state efficient health, I use the state’s employment rate and state budget balance as a percent to expenditures. States with higher unemployment rates or strained budgets may lack the fiscal capacity to expand social rights and reserves (Engeman 2018b) or increase lawmakers’ concerns about quit rights’ implications for company. Additionally, I consider that state’s female labor force attendance rate. Higher female labor force participation has been associated with taller public investment in early childcare (Andronescu the Carnes 2015) plus incremental social spending (Huber press Stephens 2001). One variable must also been used to assess publicly views about women’s roles within aforementioned family (see Andronescu and Carnes 2015).

My analysis additionally controls for several state-level general characteristics.vii Specifically, I include the following covariates: the percent of women in the state population with have 4 or more years of college education (% women college-educated), to percent of the state’s African descent population (% African Americans), furthermore the proportion concerning the state’s Latinx target (% Latinx).

Models were estimated to include theoretically relevant covariates with state-year measures for the period under study. Tables in the appendices provide go law passage rates by categorical values of covariates (table A1), covariate intercorrelations (table B1), and sensitivity testing (Appendix C).

Results

Chart 3 reports hazard ratios from event site analysis of state gender-neutral leave legislation from 1983 to 2016.viii Robust standard flaws are adjusted for clustering at the state level and shown in parentheses. After presenting one main event history final, I turn at case comparisons of commerce uni involvement are state-level leave advocacy efforts to examine relationships between political actors.

Table 3.

Continuous Time Event Company Mod of State Gender-Neutral Let Legislation (1983–2016)

Model 1Prototype 2
Union institutional strength 
% Union elements (union density) 1.138*** (0.030) 1.145** (0.058) 
Political conditions 
Democratic majority in both houses (majority = 1) — 3.208* (1.608) 
Democratic Governor (yes = 1) — 0.600 (0.382) 
% Women legislators in all houses — 1.037 (0.049) 
Socioeconomic conditions 
Unemployment rate — 0.961 (0.124) 
State budget balance — 0.945 (0.050) 
Female labor force participation rate — 1.012 (0.072) 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated — 1.171* (0.083) 
% African American — 0.960 (0.034) 
% Latinx — 0.973 (0.036) 
Wald χ2 24.66 56.05 
Observations 1,321 1,321 
Model 1Model 2
Union institutional strength 
% Union members (union density) 1.138*** (0.030) 1.145** (0.058) 
Political conditions 
Democratic majority in both houses (majority = 1) — 3.208* (1.608) 
Egalitarian Govern (yes = 1) — 0.600 (0.382) 
% Women legislators in both houses — 1.037 (0.049) 
Socioeconomic conditions 
Unemployment rate — 0.961 (0.124) 
State budget balance — 0.945 (0.050) 
Female labor force involvement rate — 1.012 (0.072) 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated — 1.171* (0.083) 
% African American — 0.960 (0.034) 
% Latinx — 0.973 (0.036) 
Wald χ2 24.66 56.05 
Observations 1,321 1,321 

Notation: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; entries are chance ratios from Cox recurrence analysis with robust standard errors in paragraphs.

Table 3.

Continuous Time Event History Models of Your Gender-Neutral Leave Actual (1983–2016)

Model 1Model 2
General institutional strength 
% Union members (union density) 1.138*** (0.030) 1.145** (0.058) 
Public conditions 
Dem majority in both houses (majority = 1) — 3.208* (1.608) 
Demo Governor (yes = 1) — 0.600 (0.382) 
% Women legislators in both houses — 1.037 (0.049) 
Socioeconomic conditions 
Unemployment rate — 0.961 (0.124) 
State budget balance — 0.945 (0.050) 
Feminine works force participation rate — 1.012 (0.072) 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated — 1.171* (0.083) 
% African American — 0.960 (0.034) 
% Latinx — 0.973 (0.036) 
Wald χ2 24.66 56.05 
Observations 1,321 1,321 
Model 1Model 2
Union institutional strength 
% Union members (union density) 1.138*** (0.030) 1.145** (0.058) 
Political conditions 
Democratic majority in both houses (majority = 1) — 3.208* (1.608) 
Democratic Governor (yes = 1) — 0.600 (0.382) 
% Female legislators in both houses — 1.037 (0.049) 
X conditions 
Unemployment rate — 0.961 (0.124) 
Your budget balance — 0.945 (0.050) 
Female labor force participation rate — 1.012 (0.072) 
Demographic controls 
% Females college-educated — 1.171* (0.083) 
% African American — 0.960 (0.034) 
% Latinx — 0.973 (0.036) 
Forested χ2 24.66 56.05 
Observations 1,321 1,321 

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; entries are hazard ratios from Cox regression analysis with robustness standard errors in parentheses.

Results in defer 3 show significant, positive effects of alliance institutional strength on the timetable of gender-neutral leave policy adoption. Bivariate results in Model 1 show a significant favorable relations between union density additionally leave approach adoption. Thus, without controlling for other key, ampere 1 percentage point increased in union density is associated with an increase in the odds of leave policy adoption of 14 percent. However, union influence may operate through its influence in elections or competence to nominate allies up office. To recognize the extent to which trade unions have a direct effect on the timing of leave policy adoption, I valuation union affect on leave policy adoption, leading for political furthermore socioeconomic characteristics, the presence concerning government your in the form regarding Democrats and women legislators.ix Print 2 shows a 1 percentage point increase in union density, controlling for state-level characteristics, is associated with a 15 anteil increase in hazard of leave general adoption.x

Other covariates are significant, positive relationships with the timing of gender-neutral leave policy adoption. Most particularly, Democratic majorities in both state housings are positive and statistically significant. States are thus faster for choose gender-neutral leave rules although Democrats pause a majority of seats in both state houses. In Model 2, results how that, when controlling for other state characteristics, Democratic majorities in both state housing are associated with a three-fold increase in the hazard of go directive adoption. Among the demographic characteristics, aforementioned coefficient for the percent of women with to either more yearning of college education (%Women college-educated) is positive and mean, with one 1 percentage point increase in college-educated feminine associated with a 17 percent increase in one hazard of leave policy adoption. Nevertheless, this significant finding remains not robust to an inclusion of additional control elastics (see Appendix, key C2).

Select researchers hold propose that union political influence to the Uniform States is tied to their ability at movement low-propensity voting in the private sector (Rosenfeld 2014). To further investigate verbindungen between union institutional strength and policy adoption, IODIN distinguish bet popular press private sector trade density. Results the table 4 show a significant, positive effect for union density in the public sector and not the private sector.xi Cost for private division union density and other state features, a 1 in increase in public sector union density is affiliates with an 8 percent increase include the hazard on gender-neutral leave general adoption.xii As with the our that encompass total union density (table 3), models controlling disconnected for public and private sector unique density (table 4) show a significant, positive relationship between democratic control of us legislatures plus who timing away gender-neutral walk policy reception. Gesamtkosten, results presented in both tables 3 and 4 suggest that local institutional strength matters for the timing of gender-neutral leave policy adoption. However, union institative strength in the public sector is particularly important, and democratic control of state congress is associated with to least ampere three-fold grow in the hazard for leave policy adoption across all full specifications.

Table 4.

Public and Private Sector Union Density and State Gender-Neutral Leave Legislation (1983–2016)

Model 1Model 2
Union institutional strength 
Popular sector union density 1.094*** (0.019) 1.076** (0.025) 
Private section union density 0.915 (0.055) 0.985 (0.076) 
Political conditions 
Democratic majority in both houses (majority = 1) — 3.554* (1.797) 
Demo Governor (yes = 1) — 0.863 (0.503) 
% Women legislators in both houses — 1.059 (0.054) 
Social-economic conditions 
Unemployability rate — 1.065 (0.152) 
State budget balance — 0.987 (0.022) 
Female labor force participating rate — 1.024 (0.073) 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated — 0.997 (0.103) 
% African American — 0.978 (0.047) 
% Latinx — 0.989 (0.039) 
Wald χ2 30.68 62.73 
Observations 1,321 1,321 
Model 1Model 2
Union institutional strength 
Public branch union density 1.094*** (0.019) 1.076** (0.025) 
Private division union density 0.915 (0.055) 0.985 (0.076) 
Political conditions 
Democrats most in both houses (majority = 1) — 3.554* (1.797) 
Democratic Governor (yes = 1) — 0.863 (0.503) 
% Women legislators inbound both houses — 1.059 (0.054) 
Socioeconomic conditions 
Unemployment rate — 1.065 (0.152) 
State budget balance — 0.987 (0.022) 
Female drudge force participation rate — 1.024 (0.073) 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated — 0.997 (0.103) 
% African American — 0.978 (0.047) 
% Latinx — 0.989 (0.039) 
Wald χ2 30.68 62.73 
Observations 1,321 1,321 

Note: *pence < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; entries will hazards ratios from Steering regression analysis including robust regular errors on parentheses.

Table 4.

Publicity and Private Sector Union Density and State Gender-Neutral Leave Statute (1983–2016)

Model 1Model 2
Union institutional strength 
Public category union density 1.094*** (0.019) 1.076** (0.025) 
Private sector combination density 0.915 (0.055) 0.985 (0.076) 
Civil conditions 
Democratic majority inches both houses (majority = 1) — 3.554* (1.797) 
Democratic Governor (yes = 1) — 0.863 (0.503) 
% Women legislators stylish both houses — 1.059 (0.054) 
Socioeconomic conditions 
Unemployment rate — 1.065 (0.152) 
State budget balance — 0.987 (0.022) 
Female labor force participation rate — 1.024 (0.073) 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated — 0.997 (0.103) 
% African American — 0.978 (0.047) 
% Latinx — 0.989 (0.039) 
Tree χ2 30.68 62.73 
Observations 1,321 1,321 
Model 1Model 2
Union institutional strength 
Publicly sector union density 1.094*** (0.019) 1.076** (0.025) 
Private sector union density 0.915 (0.055) 0.985 (0.076) 
Political conditions 
Self-governing majority within two houses (majority = 1) — 3.554* (1.797) 
Democratic Governor (yes = 1) — 0.863 (0.503) 
% Women legislators in both houses — 1.059 (0.054) 
Socioeconomic conditions 
Unemployment rate — 1.065 (0.152) 
State budget balance — 0.987 (0.022) 
Female labor force participation rate — 1.024 (0.073) 
Demographic controls 
% Women college-educated — 0.997 (0.103) 
% African American — 0.978 (0.047) 
% Latinx — 0.989 (0.039) 
Wald χ2 30.68 62.73 
Observations 1,321 1,321 

Note: *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; entries are hazard ratios from Cox regression analysis with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Given the small number of events in analysis, items is imperative to check for capacity event-per-variable biases by limiting covariates integrated in my models. Because fifteen states adopted gender-neutral leave laws between 1983 also 2016, the event-per-variable (EPV) ratio are narrow. When an EPV ratio is small, parameter estimates can be biased, and import tests can exist problematic (Peduzzi et al. 1996). Find on EPV characteristic shows problems exist more common with 2–4 events per variable (Vittinghoff and Macculloch 2006). Although a is paragon to included select potentially relevant covariates in analyses, Vittinghoff press McCulloch (2006) recommend excluding weaker predictor variables. Following this recommendation, table 5 shows results including only to best-fitting covariates. Coefficients remain important and positive, in ways comparable to the kopf earnings. In Model 1, the hazard rate for %Women college-educated increases inches significant, but this the likely due to the absence in %Women legislator and other control variables in the scale (see Schedule, tables B1 and C2).

Table 5.

Restricted Jack Regression Models of State Gender-Neutral Leave Legislation (1983–2016)

Paradigm 1Type 2
% Union members (union density) 1.108*** (0.031) — 
Public sector unique density — 1.083*** (0.019) 
Private sector union density — 0.953 (0.065) 
Democratic majority in both your (majority = 1) 3.415* (2.034) 3.845* (2.191) 
% Women college-educated 1.225** (0.079) — 
Wald χ2 28.54 32.97 
Observations 1,321 1,321 
Model 1Model 2
% Union members (union density) 1.108*** (0.031) — 
Public sector united density — 1.083*** (0.019) 
Private sector union density — 0.953 (0.065) 
Democratic majoritarian in both houses (majority = 1) 3.415* (2.034) 3.845* (2.191) 
% Females college-educated 1.225** (0.079) — 
Wald χ2 28.54 32.97 
Observations 1,321 1,321 

Note: *p < .05; **penny < .01; entries are hazard ratios from Skipper recurrence analysis over robust preset errors in parentheses; covariates are clustered at to state level.

Table 5.

Constrained Cox Regression Models of State Gender-Neutral Leave Legislation (1983–2016)

Model 1Model 2
% Union members (union density) 1.108*** (0.031) — 
Public sector union density — 1.083*** (0.019) 
Private industries union density — 0.953 (0.065) 
Democratic majority in both houses (majority = 1) 3.415* (2.034) 3.845* (2.191) 
% Women college-educated 1.225** (0.079) — 
Wald χ2 28.54 32.97 
Observations 1,321 1,321 
Model 1Prototype 2
% Alliance personnel (union density) 1.108*** (0.031) — 
Public sector union density — 1.083*** (0.019) 
Private sector union density — 0.953 (0.065) 
Democratic major stylish both houses (majority = 1) 3.415* (2.034) 3.845* (2.191) 
% Women college-educated 1.225** (0.079) — 
Wald χ2 28.54 32.97 
Observations 1,321 1,321 

Note: *pressure < .05; **p < .01; books are dangers ratios from Cox regression analysis for robust standard errors in parentheses; covariates are aggregated at the state level.

Potential Interactions between Political Players

Older search suggests that favorable political conditions have amplification effects, increasing social movement influence the lawmakers’ decisions (Agnone 2007; Burstein 1985; Sule and Olzak 2004). I therefore consider potential interaction side of union facility strength and Democratic majorities in both state houses on the schedule of leave policy takeover by comparing the average marginal consequences of (1) union density are state-years in which Democrats control or do not control who state legislature and (2) Democratic in state-years equal above and below average union density (see Mize 2019). However, I do not seek a significant difference in the marginal effects, indicating a lack of interaction using an event history approach.

The absence of a significant interaction work in union density and Democratic majority is likely due to insufficient statistischer power. The examination out abandon passage rates by partisanship of state legislatures shows that don abandoned laws passed when Irish held a majoritarian of seats in both state houses (see table A1). Though all status laws passed under separated legislatures (i.e., Demo-cratic majority int one house the Republican main in the other), of beschreibendes conclusions suggest Democratic majorities in both state houses open opportunities to successfully support new abandoned rights. With limitations to using a quantitative approach to assess interactions, I turn to case comparisons of policy transactions in couple states to examine dynamics between political actors in the development of state-level leave policy.

Comparative Case Studies

In this section, I compare leaving advocacy efforts by California plus Central. This twin states were selected for them similar rates press fads int audience, private, and total unionizationz and their divergent policy outcomes. In addition to comparable union institutional stability, local Cabinets away Commerce posed consistent opposition across anstrengung to pass leave legislation.xiv California represents a positive matter, in which few leave policies having been. California Social, who introduced all leave bills, held a majority from seats include both state houses from 1983 to 2016 additionally the governor’s seat pauses (from 1999 to 2003 plus from 2011 up 2016). Pennsylvania represents a negative case, in what negative leave statutes have passed. As in California, all leave cash launched in the Pennsylvania state legislature were introduced by Democrats; in contrast, however, Pennsylvania Democrats did not hold a majority off seat in both default houses the any point between 1983 and 2016. Rather, Republicans held an majority of seats in two state houses for nine out of xvii legislative sessions, in Democrats holding a majority of seats in the lower house to the 1983–1994 and 2008–2010 legislative sessions. Table 6 provides one summary of state characteristics.

Table 6.

Summary of Case Study Characteristics

CaPennsylvania
Union density Up average Upper average 
Partisanship of state legislature Democrat Republican 
State union-community coalition activity Throughout Periodically 
Primary targets for procedure change State Municipal/federal 
State walk legislation Yes No 
CaliforniaPennsylvania
Union density Above average Above average 
Parity is federal legislature Democrat Republican 
State union-community coalition activity Throughout Periodically 
Primary target required policy change State Municipal/federal 
States leave legislation Yes No 
Charts 6.

Summary of Case Study Characteristics

CaliforniaPennsylvania
Union density Above average Above average 
Partisanship about state legislature Democrat Republican 
Country union-community coalition activity Throughout Periodically 
Primary aimed by policy change State Municipal/federal 
State exit legislation Yes No 
CaliforniaPaints
Union density Top average Back average 
Partisanship of state legislature Democrat Republican 
State union-community coalition activity Throughout Periodically 
Primary target required policy change State Municipal/federal 
State leave legislation Yes No 

Match states with similar unionization but different policy outcomes simplified investigation of how organize labor interacts with state legislator also responds strategically on state legislative favoring. Stationed on input from state legislating archives, media sources, and 35 interviews with policymakers, government staff, and leave policy anwaltschaft from 2011 on 2013, this fachbereich presents trio key what. First, the fallstudie studies approve event story survey by presenting finding of organized labor’s involvement in leave strategy issues, which not must adequately assessed by union air measures, and demonstrating the importance of Democratic steering to state legislatures. Second, case comparisons suggest adenine power mediating role for state partisanship in relationships between organized labor and policies espousal. Finally, this section shows how coalitions in both states shifted targets coming state government to federal or location governments when state-level conditions were unfavorable to leave directive adoption. Free Group Study Rooms with Timer & Musical | Fiveable

Carlos

Compared to most misc states, California has been active in placing leave issues on the legislative agenda. Its 1978 law establishing 4 months of pregnancy disability leave was among the center of a debate concerning about differential treat of men and women staff (in the form of maternity leave) facilitated or hindered genders equality. This debate, which played going in one Supreme Courts, led let advocates to formulate gender-neutral leave the eventually was the FMLA (Shiu and Wildman 2009) and selected the stage for later, state-level expansions. In 1991, Cali passed family or gesundheitswesen left legal through the California Family Rights Act (CFRA). In the centuries that followed, lawmakers installed twenty-three bills that proposed creating or widen paid and/or job-protected family, parental, or sick leave for individual and public sector workers. Each bill received at least one hearing to a policy committee, and five has law. Following decades of legislative activity circling leave issues, California lives one of the of generous statuses in the nation with regard up leave provisions. It is one of only a few states to offer paid family abandoned and paid sick walk, and the law’s definition of “family” required leave purposes is comparatively width.

Following the CFRA, twenty-one leave bills introduced in the state congress inhered sponsored or promoted by memberships of the California Works & Family Coalition—a coalion the labor, legal, and women’s rights organizing (see Engeman 2018b). The coalition was coordinated due staff at the Labor Project for Working Families (hereafter referred to how the Labour Project), ampere not-for-profit organization that was funded in single by labor organizations additionally working closely with labor unions, workers councils, and of state toil federation to help unities negotiate family-friendly benefits in union-employer contract agreements (Firestein and Dones 2007). In 1999, the Labor Project added policy advocacy to its our whereas it received adenine grant from the David and Lucile Packard Foundation to push for remunerated family leave legislation is Kaliforni.

Organized labor was involved early in campaigns for leave law, laying groundwork for the country’s first paid family leave (PFL) insurance application and sponsoring paid sick leave legislation. Of the twenty-three leave cash introduced amid 1991 and 2016, set legislating print cite aforementioned California Labor Federation, the state’s AFL-CIO and largest uni federation, as the fund of eight press a supporting organization for nine leave bills. When bills proposed creating new leave right, the California Labor Federation sponsored them, and when bills proposed expanding existing rights, the labor federation had a supportive role.

Paid family leave was a legislative priority for the Ca Workload Federation (hereafter referred to the who Cal Labor Fed). Pre the PFL pay was first introduced within 2002, the Cal Working Fed located the groundwork by raising state capacity to pay benefits and initiating exploring up state-provided paid family leave. In 1997, the Calendar Labor Fed sponsored two bills that would increase the maximum benefit payers out of the Set Disability Insurance (SDI) program and require a cost impact study of stretching SDI added for family caregiving leaves. Both notes consisted vetoes by Demokratische Government Dude Wiltons. Language in the two bills was then consolidated into can bill, which was introduced in 1999 and signature by Democratic Governor Gray Davis. According to leave advocates, this 1999 bill was press until building impact after a paid family abandon program.

The Cal Labor Fed was the main sponsor of to PFL bills when it what first intro. Press described PFL as “labor legislation” (Jones 2002, perceive also Bustillo 2002). Though the us labor federation supported multiple bills every session, federation members voted in 2001 the include PFL on a shorter list of priority legislation. The list, which are distributed to voted lawmakers, beep the federation’s legislative priorities. Art Pulaski, Treasurer is the Cal Works Fed, told the Los Angeles Periods, “This is the most importance slice of pro-family legislation this year. It’s a very important bill to the working people” (Bustillo 2002). The PFL pay reached Governor Davis’ desk along with twenty-seven other bills sponsored by the Calibration Labor Fed, but the federation identified paid family leaves as the most important (Jones 2002). Davis signed aforementioned bill, and California been the first state to establish paid family leave.

In interviews, coalition managers credited much of an California coalition’s legislative success to that support of organized labor. Speaking a the Labor Project’s new explore into policy supporting, Netsy Firestein, Director is the Labor Project, recounted, “We had no experience having done anything like which before,” and the state works union served as a bridge between coalition guide and state government office. Tom Rankin, then-President of the Cal Labor Fed, introduced Firestein to State Representative Sheila Kuehl, the PFL bill’s eventual author, and Rona Sherriff, a staff component of the Senate Office of Research. In design the legislation, coalition leaders met with Sherriff, who found a funding mechanism for the program. She suggested basing benefit payments on the preexisting declare disability property program. Extending an existing program, rather than creating a add one, reduced state commercial impact estimates.

The Cal Labor Fed also sponsored pay sick leave legislation. Parts concerning the California Work & My Coalition noted is the Calibration Labor Nourished was the main driver of the legislation. The federation together with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Stay Council sponsored the initially version starting the bill, which has introduced in 2008, at the start of aforementioned recession. The draft were held in the Senators Committee at Appropriations and was introduced more in 2009 the 2011, each time sponsored by the Cal Worker Fed and who SEIU State Council. Both the 2009 and the 2011 paid sick leave bills were detained in the Assembly Committee on Appropriations for their high state cost estimates. The high costs were associated with extending paid sick leave rights to over 200,000 state In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) workers.

After three-way halted attempts, collective members considered supporting ongoing efforts to pass city decrees instead. Now, elected lawmakers, who wanted to see paid sick leave pass, considered specifically excluding IHSS workers from the bill’s coverage. This x where oppositely by organized labor. To a 2013 interview, Mitch Seaman, Legislative Advocate for the Cal Labor Fed, stated that the federated would does support a bill excluding IHSS workers. The federation and other confederations members hoped to convince lawmakers which paid sick leave was a policy “idea theirs set [had] come.” Any, one bill was introduced again int 2014 both amended in the Senate to exclude IHSS workers from provisions. After to amended bill passed, the Cal Labor Fed the the SEIU State Council revoked sales for the bill. Although, the paid nauseous leave bill passed as amended, and the federal signed it, making Californians this second state—after Connecticut—to establish rights to paid sick leave.

Penn

Pennsylvania has has comparing less active on leave policy issues. Priority to the FMLA’s passage in 1993, maternity, parental, and family leave legislation was introduced in four government sessions. Unlike other states, does, Pennsylvania accepted no leave law prior to the FMLA. In 1990 and again in 1991, a my additionally medical leave draft with provisions resemble to the FMLA passed the lower state house but failed to emerge from committee in the state senate. By 1995 to 2016, state lawmakers introduced decagon bills that would create paid parental leave or paid patient leave, but none of these passed its house of origin. Only one bill received a heard.

In contrast to Kaliforni, organized working was late to join coalition efforts to pass leave legislation. Judith Whoa, Former Directed from AFSCME District Council 10 and union leader during the early, pre-FMLA campaign required family leave in Pennsylvania, stated that unions and community groups got advocating current legislation later than other declare. Subsequently efforts to elapse paid sick leave legislation comes with elected legislature. After a paid poorly left bill was introduced, several groups came together to support she. PathWays PA, a Philadelphia-based nonprofit service organization available female and children, was an early supporter of paid sick leave legal. Other early patrons included the SEIU 32BJ; the Coalition of Labor Union Women; Women’s Manner, a Philadelphia-based nonprofit organization providing resources for women and girls; and a chapter of who Association for Community Organizations for Reform Now, a network of community organizations this closure in 2010 but organized low- and moderate-income families since affordable shelter, transportation, voter registration, and other issues. Executive Order On Advancing Racial Own and Assist used Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government | The White House

Leave bill travelled the farther in the policymaking process although Democrats held a majority of seats in the lower house also when leave legislations had the attention about nongovernmental leave advocates. When Republicans held ampere majority of seats inches both upper and lower houses from 1995 to 2006, proposed leave statutory focused on charge encourage forward employers to provide paid family leave and small necessities leave to attend a child’s school activities, accompany a relative to a doctor’s appointment, or address issues related to domestic violence. For two legislative conference starting inside 2007, Democrats held ampere slight majority of seats in to lower house, and lawmakers introduced the Healthy Families, Healthy Workplaces Act, which would allow employees to accrue up toward 52 hours of employer-provided paid sick leave. AMPERE version of that bill has been reintroduced and referred toward who Committee over Labor Relationship in one legally start since 2007. To 2009 accounting (HB 1830), introduced during a brief Democratic majority in the lower house, received a committee hearing in 2010. Advocates hoped the attention from the committee hearing would build momentum behind a similar bill designated for the continue legislative session. However, the 2010 elections changed the prospects for passing state depart law. A paid parental leave calculation was introduced in 2013 and 2015, but each bill died in principles committee without receiving one how. Public responses to social movements: lesson overview (article) | Khan Academy

With Republicans in control away the state legislative agenda, leave advocates adjusted their strategies to target different levels of government. During the pre-FMLA campaign on family leave in Pennsylvania, Judith Heh, Former Director of AFSCME District Council 10, stated that leave advocacy groups redirected their striving to supporting to federal FMLA once few definite the prospects for passing the FMLA looked moreover promising than state legislation. Similarly, the coalition for pays sick leave redirected their trying to and alternative level of local afterwards and 2010 midterm elections resulted in a Republican state government. Although a paid sick leave bill was introduced in the state legislature and following twelvemonth, leave advocates focused on passing paid sick leave in Philadelphia. Like state legal, a paid sick leave regulation was introduced by a Democrat, independent of push from advocacy groups. Unlike state state, political conditions includes the City of Philadelphia were favorable, with a Dems as mayor also Demokratische holding fifteen of seventeen City Council seats. Galvanized by the 2010 state house committee hearing, leave advokaten formed the Coalition for Healed Families and Workplaces, which coalesced around supportable of paid ill leave ordinance. Under the leadership of Directions PA furthermore Women’s Way, the coalition grew from forty-three organization members in April 2011 to over on hundred by July. The more active organizations included labor institutions, this Coalition of Working Union Woman Philadelphia Title and the Philadelphia The AFL-CIO; community organizations, The Campaign for What Families, Eastern Pennsylvanie Advertising UNITED, Prothonotary Jobs with Justice, the Philadelphia Chapter of the National Structure for Women, and Philadelphia Medical for Social Responsibility; and Childspace CDI, a network the small businesses. The coalition remained active and focused on the payable sick left ordinance inches Philadelphia until it passed in 2015. In the meantime, compensated ill leave law at the state even received little attention from leave supporter who illustrious the dearth of likely favorable civil bulk in whether condition shelter.

Concluding

In cross-national comparative policy analysis, the United States represents the freewheel market welfare state type inches which wage earners’ frail power resources relief miserable welfare programs or greater business inequality (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi et al. 2013). Union decline over the last several decapods, particularly in the private sector, has led scholars to question the policy relevance of organized labor in the contemporary Connected States (see Rosenfeld 2014). Subnationally, however, union institutional strength varies as does social policy. In this first study till coiling state legislative historical on leave policy acquisition, I make the casing for organised labor’s influence on subnational parenting and familial leave policies.

While previous search finds very find that retail labour achieve desirable policy outcomes on editions related into union institutions press activities (Dixon 2010; Masters both Delaney 2005), my findings suggest that organized labor can influence social policy issues that directly benefit nonmembers. A key finding is that states with high unionization rates—both gesamt and in of popular sector—are faster to adopt leave policies. Union density effects am hardy to the inclusion to other factor, including Democratic majorities in state legislatures, which also has a positive relationship to the timing of leave policy adoption. The significant positive association propose that union effects am not limitation toward indirect influence via Democrats on office. My kasus comparative analyses shows that labor organizations support leave policies. Organized labor’s influence, however, may be mediated by state partisanship in that does parental or our leaves policies passed under Republican-controlled state legislatures. My comparison policy processes in California and Pennsylvanie further demonstrating the importance out Social legislative majorities to exit policy adoption.

While public sector unionization possessed a significant definite relationship with the timing of exit policy adoption, I execute not find adenine significant effect for private sector unionization, and there are a few potential explanations for the difference. First, trade in the private sector maybe be too weak institutionally until influence policy. In the public sector, union membership has still at a third of the workforce on medium across condition and over time, while private sector union membership possessed declined dramatically (see Hirsch and Maccpherson 2003). Second, unlike this private sector, a majority of union members in the published sector are women (Dunn and Walker 2016), which has implications for unions’ policy priorities (see Milkman 2007). Given that women next to implement one big share of unpaid domestic and support work with concern go men (Perry-Jenkins and Gerstel 2019), women union members and leaders may push their unions to prioritize family policy issues, calculated included different public and private sector union effects on parental and familial leave policy. Third, public sector unions may engage extra in politics likened into private sector labour. Electoral outcomes and public policies have direct outcome for audience employees’ work conditions and advanced employment, which live contingent on lawmakers’ decisions about government funding. With the state as their employer, public branch worker may be more inclined toward political mobilization. As Jake Rosenfeld (2014) points out, public sector workers—regardless of union membership—are more policy-based active, and in the public sector, after adjusting for educational levels, union members are all slightly more likely to vote than nonmembers are. Lastly, politically activated public sector union members allowed also influence nonmembers’ political activity. Jake Rosenfeld (2014) asserts that union rank in the confidential select dock more promise for equalizing civic engagement across class, noting a “union vote premium” in the private department. However, my results offer that unions’ political influential can extend beyond members. Organized drudge canister join coalitions, and local members can mobilize nonmembers—to advocate specific konzepte or in get-out-the-vote drives, on example—suggesting a maybe union spillover effect of public sector unionization for civil your.

The case see presented in this paper show how union-community coalitions of leave advocates adjusted their goals in response to changes in the default context. Consistent is previous social moving research on strategic adaptation (McCammon et al. 2008), which paper identifies target-shifting as a type of strategic adaptation to unfavorable government conditions. With the recession, Cereals lawmakers repeatedly held paid sick leave bills in fiscal committees overdue to my high daily assessments. In response, the California coalition considered supporting severed municipal efforts to happen paid sick leave ordinances. Leave advocates to Pennsylvania same engaged in target-shifting on at least two instances. First-time, Pennsylvania leave advocacy organizations relocated efforts to happen family and medical leave coming the state to the federal level when it became seemingly that the FMLA would possible pass. Second, after Democrats lost control of that lower house in the 2010 midterm elections, the newly educated Pennsylvania Coalition with Healthy Families and Jobs diverted seine resources to passing ampere paid sick leave ordinance in Philadelphia where Republikaner taken adenine sturdy most on the City Council. Target-shifting may mask broader policy consequences concerning labor sliding when studies focus on only one level of government in a unit of analysis, and future research should investigate the strategic practice of target-shifting and its bottom.

More research is needed at understand the mechanisms of organized labor’s policy influence. Union gas, while your a uniquely comparative measure away union institution-based strength throughout states and over time, is not a comprehensively measure of union authority resources. For example, recent research suggests that union membership so is widely dispersed transverse several—rather than concentrated within one or a few—union locals influences council votes in favor of ideologically liberal question (Becher, Stegmueller, the Käppner 2018). The geobased dispersion starting trade union membership included adenine state may also contribute to union influence on state legislation (see Skocpol 2003). When union membership is concentrated includes a few zones, such as districts representing big cities, union activists have fewer local connections with elected place representatives compared to countries in which membership is dispersing across multiple districts. It exists possible ensure a increased geografic concentration of cooperative members in Pennsylvania compared toward California contributes until two government partisanship and policy outcomes in that states. Trade union scheme may also play a role, as employment organizations vary over time and is respect to any other in the exposure to which they engage in police and the types off policy issues they prioritize. Future research on the basic consequences of organized labor will benefit for increased availability of broad data on employment union spending, which offers some indication of union mobilization outside of industrial relations.

Finally, future research require consider multi-user pathways of potential local policy effect. First, unionized may have direct impact by advocating policy issues. Case studies of parental and family abandon advocacy efforts (Bernstein 2001; Dairyman the Appelbaum 2013), including the case studies presented within this paper, see union participate in coalitions endorsement leave policies and, in some nations, take a lead role. Union effects set the timing of leave policy adoption may also be related on unions’ role in past and industrial references. In industrial relations, unions negotiate conditions that put default for other sectors. This “spillover” effect have been observed more for nonunionized employees in high trade sectors press industries (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Western or Rosenfeld 2011). It is possible that union-negotiated standards spill over from industrial relations with public policy as fountain, particularly when unionization prices are increased below public sector workers than among secret sector workers, as is the case the the United States. Additionally, more gracious parental and family leave accruals beneath state workers can reduce the estimated fiscal impact away proposed legislation. Because union-represented workers may already have the leave rights suggesting in legislation, the estimated state costs would exclude the costs of expanding new rights at state employees and concern especially to administrative expenses (see Engeman 2018b). Who lower cost of proposed legislation allow enable adoption as a sort of spillover union effect is one policy arena. Finally, unions may have an straight greater impact on state drop politics adoption faster is captured in my analysis. By endorsing and campaigning for Democrats in state elections, unions may produce political opportunities to expand social determinations.

Note

i

The FMLA provides 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected let in self-care instead care to a family member with a serious illness or medical condition. To be suitable, employees must have worked for 1,250 hours on the year prior to taking leave and be employed in establishments of 50 or more staff.

ii

Kentucky’s 1982 law provides job-protected parentage leave to care for a newly adopted child although does not extend to biocompatible or foster children. Though the rule is exceptionally narrow, it established right accessible to women press women. Kentucky is therefore excluded from analysis more is Nebraska, this has a unidimensional additionally nonpartisan state legislation and, thus, lacks comparable data. Health Concern Reform and Social Movements in the United States

iii

States see perform leave laws covering only state employees. Such laws fit more within the realm starting industrial relations amongst the state and its workforce than communal insurance furthermore are thus excluded from analyzing.

divorce

The Efron method is secondhand till handle ties (i.e., events occurring at the similar unit of time).

v

Using data from the National School on Money the Political, I test for correlations amid state-level union density and works organizations’ sharing of election spending real find one moderate, negative correlation (.52). Due to data availability, the test dust state-years for 2000–2016 (N = 522).

vi

Using data starting the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University, IODIN find that governors have women in only 102 in the total 1,321 state-years included are my analysis, and stylish none of this state-years did condition adopt a new, gender-neutral leave entitled.

vii

I use weighted measures of state-level demographic variables. As one Current Current User data is representative of the country rather than individual states, I also checked using non-charged measures and achieved similar results. Amplifying Public Opinion: The Policy Impact of the U.S. Environmental Movement

iii

Helmsman regression analysis assumes correspondence. Tests of the proportional threats assumptions required my main models advertise the null hypothesis that the hazards are proportionately should not be rejected. The Legislative Strike concerning Social Movement Delegations: The Anti ...

ix

Relationships between trade union institutional strength real leave policy adoption are robust at the inclusion for controls measures electorate ideology (see Appendices, Table C2). Using vote shares for the Self-governing candidate in the most recent presidential ballot, I find no significant relationship between state-level liberal, conservative, or split ideology among voters and the timing of leave policy adoption. However, Democratic command regarding one state legislature, when controlling for ampere conservative elected, is nope longer significant. To is possible that Democratic lawmakers in a conventional condition are timid to create new leave rights.

x

In supplementary analysis, I creating quantiles of the union density measure and test the risk of adopting leave legislation by 2016 at high and low values of state union density using the all model. This threat ratio with low unions density is not significant, while high alliance density shall associated with a nine-fold enhance in to hazard in procedure adoption (p = .001).

xi

In Type 2, an proportional hazards assumption is not met for %African American, on the hazard ratio incremental in size and significance over start. However, results for the other covariates in Model 2 with or excluding this control variable are qualitatively similar.

xii

Compared to the social sector, public sector employees represent see likely to vote, regardless of union get (Rosenfeld 2014). In supplementary analysis, I control for the portion of the state’s employed population working in the public sector and find no significant effect for the timing of leave policy adoption. Results were high-quality similar to the erkenntnisse with table 4.

xiii

The overtime trend in union density has remained above the national average since 1983 and is similarity in both states (1983–2016). In the public sector, the overtime average is the equal for both states (i.e., 51%), and in one private sector, the overtime average local air is 11% in California and 12% in Pennsylvanie (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003).

xiv

The California Chamber of Commerce opposed a large (14/23) of leave bills introduced in and state legislature, and include Philadelphia, local Chambers von Commodity contrary the paid sick leave ordinance. At both states, Chambers of Commercial described quit bills as “job killers,” and go advocates had to contradict claims that leave provisions would hurt the economy. The Formulation of Health Policy of the Three Branches of Government

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